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Background: The revision process for and recent publication of the DSM-5 initiated debates 
about the widening of diagnostic boundaries. The pharmaceutical industry had a major financial 
stake in the outcome of these debates. This study examines the three-part relationship among 
DSM panel members, PIs of clinical trials for new DSM-5 diagnoses, and drug companies.  
Methods: Financial conflicts of interest (FCOI) of DSM panel members responsible for some 
new diagnoses in the DSM-5 and PIs of clinical trials for related drug treatments were identified. 
Trials were found by searching ClinicalTrials.gov. Patent and revenue information about these 
drugs was found using the FDA Orange Book and manufacturer Annual Reports. 
Results: Thirteen trials met inclusion criteria (testing drugs for some new DSM disorders). Sixty-
one percent of the DSM Task Force members and 27% of Work Group members reported FCOI 
to the trial drug manufacturers. In 5 of the 13 trials (38%), PIs reported ties other than research 
funding to the drug manufacturer. In three of the trials (23%), a PI had financial ties to the drug 
manufacturer and was also a DSM panel member who had decision making authority over the 
revision process. 
Conclusions: These findings suggest that increased transparency (e.g., registration on 
ClinicalTrials.gov) and mandatory disclosure policies (e.g., APA’s disclosure policy for DSM-5 
panel members) alone may not be robust enough strategies to prevent the appearance of bias in 
both the DSM revision process as well as clinical decisions about appropriate interventions 




Previous research documented the financial ties between the panel members for the 
fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) and the 
drug companies that manufacture the medications used to treat the disorders identified in this 
manual [1]. To its credit, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) instituted a conflict of 
interest policy requiring all panel members on the DSM-5 to file financial disclosure statements. 
This policy resulted in some changes in work group composition; compared to DSM-IV some 
DSM-5 work groups had fewer individuals with industry ties. Elsewhere we reported [2] that this 
new APA requirement rendered the DSM’s disclosure policy more congruent with most leading 
medical journals and federal policies on financial conflicts of interest (FCOI). DSM panel 
members were required to list any FCOI for three years prior to their appointment on the DSM, 
and they could not accept more than USD 10,000 from industry (e.g., for consultancies) per year 
or hold more than USD 50,000 in stock in a pharmaceutical company during their tenure on the 
DSM [2].  
Although APA’s increased transparency was an important step forward in restoring 
public trust, the revision process for (and recent publication of) the DSM-5 ignited debates about 
the taxonomy of mental illness and the widening of diagnostic boundaries. The fact that the 
pharmaceutical industry had a major financial stake in the outcome of these debates raised 
additional concerns. Thus, the issue of trustworthiness in the revision process is a critical one. In 
2010, the APA issued an official policy document, approved by the Board of Trustees, in which 
the APA leadership stated that:  
We affirm our support of the Institute of Medicine report [Conflict of Interest in Medical 
Research, Education, and Practice]. Members involved in clinical practice, education, 
research, and administration must be diligent and aware in identifying, minimizing, and 
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appropriately managing secondary (personal) interests (financial, contractual, career-
centered) that may inhibit, distract, or unduly influence their judgment or behavior in a 
manner that detracts from or subordinates the primary interest of patients and may be 
perceived by some as undermining public trust. [3] 
Indeed, the perception of trustworthiness in relation to FCOI is critical in the medical field 
especially in terms of maintaining confidence in professional judgment. Harvard philosopher 
Dennis Thompson’s work in this area has been highly influential (see e.g., the 1993 decision 
made by NEJM to develop an FCOI policy), and he emphasizes the fact that the conflict is not an 
indictment of wrongdoing but rather points to a generic risk: “The point is to minimize or 
eliminate circumstances that would cause reasonable persons to suspect that professional 
judgment has been improperly influenced, whether or not it has” [4]. Congruent with both the 
APA’s and Thompson’s concern that FCOI may undermine public trust, we investigated how 
FCOI function in these new diagnostic categories during this period of transparency.   
The DSM-5, which was published in May 2013 [5], introduced new or revised diagnoses 
such as Binge Eating Disorder, Autism Spectrum Disorder, Disruptive Mood Dysregulation 
Disorder in children, Mild Neurocognitive Disorder, and Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder. In 
addition to the newly included diagnoses, one of the most controversial revisions in the DSM-5 is 
the elimination of the bereavement exclusion from the diagnostic criteria for a Major Depressive 
Episode. With this change, individuals who are actively grieving a loss may be diagnosed with 
Major Depressive Disorder (if they present with symptoms of depression two weeks after the 
loss). Some clinicians maintain that this change is a positive one in that now individuals who are 
actively grieving a loss may receive the diagnosis and treatment that they need. Others have 
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argued that people who are going through the normal process of grieving would now be 
diagnosed with depression.  
Indeed, pharmaceutical companies were already operating clinical trials of drugs that 
could be used to treat new DSM-5 disorders before the publication of the manual in May 2013.  
Certainly, these companies have a fiduciary responsibility to serve their shareholders’ interests 
by working to increase their shareholder value. Although questions of potential bias may be 
raised with any treatment modality, if the heavy emphasis on the use of psychotropic 
medications to treat new DSM-5 disorders is linked to the financial interests of APA panel 
members and researchers who test the safety and efficacy of drugs, then the objectivity of 
scientific findings will be questioned. The purpose behind federal and professional conflict of 
interest rules is to reduce the probability of bias entering into the decision-making process (see 
e.g., [6]).  
In fact, concerns about preventing bias and producing high quality science led the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) to recommend that only independent experts (i.e., individuals 
without commercial ties) be involved in clinical guideline decision-making [7]. Questions about 
the potential for bias when making judgments about the validity of new DSM disorders, and 
about what interventions should be developed to treat these conditions, are rendered even more 
salient when drugs being investigated as treatments for them are under patents that have expired 
or will soon expire. Without patent protection, companies lose considerable profit to generics, 
providing a strong incentive to find new indications that will effectively grant extended patent 
protection to a drug. In light of this incentive, it is critical that researchers charged with the 
responsibility of making decisions about psychiatric diagnosis and treatment do not have FCOIs 
that could increase the probability or appearance of bias in clinical decision-making. Over-
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diagnosis in the mental health field can have significant adverse public health consequences 
because it leads to unnecessary drug treatment [8]. This is the first study that investigates FCOIs 
with ongoing clinical trials, showing the three-part relationship among DSM panel members, PIs 
of clinical trials for new DSM-5 diagnoses, and drug companies. 
Methods 
We examined the FCOI of DSM panel members responsible for decisions about the inclusion of 
five new DSM disorders and one major revision (elimination of the bereavement exclusion for 
Major Depressive Disorder) and the pharmaceutical companies conducting clinical trials for 
drugs to treat these new disorders. We also examined the FCOI of PIs for the clinical trials of 
treatments for these newly included disorders, whereby FCOI is defined in this study as financial 
associations with the manufacturers of trial medications. Congruent with previous research 
[1,2,9-11], financial associations are defined in our study as consultancies, honoraria, speakers 
bureau membership, expert testimony, research funding, and stock holdings.   
The disorders investigated were: Bereavement-Related Depression, Binge Eating 
Disorder, Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder, Autism Spectrum Disorder, Mild 
Neurocognitive Disorder, and Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder. These disorders were selected 
because of the questions raised regarding their validity [12-15], concerns that these diagnoses 
lack specificity and will result in unnecessary diagnostic inflation [16], and documented 
problems with reliability [14,17].  
We searched ClinicalTrials.gov for the six disorders of interest. Because previous 
research has found that industry-affiliated clinical trials are more vulnerable to bias than 
government-funded ones [11], we excluded trials that were exclusively funded by one of the 
National Institutes of Health. It is possible that receiving NIH or NIMH funding also presents a 
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conflict of interest (financial and/or intellectual), although probably a much subtler one. There 
are ties between NIH funded investigators and grant reviewers and possibly DSM panel 
members. However, these ties are not the focus of our study. Industry sponsorship of the trials 
was identified by the sponsors and collaborators listed on the trial page. Manufacturers of the 
drugs and patent status information were identified using the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration’s (FDA) Orange Book 
(http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm).  
There are two main groups who serve on the DSM and are charged with decision-making 
authority: Task Force members and Work Groups. Task Force members provide oversight for the 
entire manual, and members of a DSM Work Group are a team of individuals who review a 
specific diagnostic category (e.g., Eating Disorders). Following previous research, we use “panel 
members” to refer collectively to both Work Group and Task Force members included in the 
study. Posted disclosure statements from the DSM-5 website for the included members of the 
DSM panel were reviewed to identify: 1) financial ties to pharmaceutical companies, and 2) any 
DSM panel member who was also a PI for one of the clinical trials. Members of the DSM-5 
Work Groups that were responsible for the five new disorders and one major revision included in 
the search (e.g., Eating Disorders Work Group for Binge Eating Disorder) were screened for 
FCOI using their posted disclosure statements on the DSM-5 website (www.dsm5.org), accessed 
between March 15, 2013 and March 25, 2013. Because of their importance in clinical decision-
making, all DSM-5 Task Force members were also screened for FCOI. Task Force members, 
who include Work Group chairs, played a critical role in the revision process by shaping the 
panel through nomination of other Work Group members, contribution to the draft criteria, and 
review of the final revisions to the draft before its final approval.   
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Additionally, we conducted internet searches to determine if PIs of the clinical trials had 
financial associations to manufacturers of trial drugs. Internet searches were conducted for 
sources published three years prior to the start of the clinical trial, a time period congruent with 
published research on FCOIs and consistent with the APA’s own FCOI policy. Searches 
included ProPublica, peer reviewed articles, conferences, participation in continuing medical 
education events (i.e., courses and/or seminars for health professionals), and self-reporting of any 
industry ties following interviews with the media. Internet searchers were also conducted for 
speakers bureau participation of DSM panel members because speakers bureau membership was 
not an identified FCOI category in the DSM-5 disclosures. Speakers bureau participation was 
included in our analysis only when there was unambiguous information.  
Results 
Thirteen clinical trials met inclusion criteria. These clinical trials were designed to investigate 10 
patented drugs and one investigational new drug. Nine of these trials were testing “blockbuster” 
drugs with patents that had expired or would expire in the next two years. Table 1 provides a 
summary of trial drugs, their patent status, and their 2012 revenue (obtained from the drug 
manufacturers’ 2012 annual reports). The trial drug manufacturer was one of the sponsors or 
collaborators for eight of the thirteen trials (62%). 
Financial ties between DSM panels and drug manufacturers. Of the 55 Work Group 
members, 15 (27%) reported at least one FCOI to a trial drug manufacturer, while 19 of 31 




In 3 of the 13 trials (23%), a DSM panel member reported speakers bureau participation 
(i.e., Company X sponsored a clinical trial for a new indication and a panel member responsible 
for decisions about inclusion of the new disorder served on the speakers bureau of Company X). 
There were three instances in which DSM panel members were also PIs (i.e., an 
individual was both a DSM panel member responsible for making decisions about including a 
new disorder and a PI for a trial for a drug to treat the new disorder); each of these three panel 
members reported an FCOI to the trial drug manufacturer. (See Table 2 for a summary of DSM 
panel member FCOI data by trial.)   
Financial ties between PIs of clinical trials and trial drug manufacturers. In five 
(38%) out of 13 trials, at least one of the trial PIs reported an FCOI other than research grant 
funding to the trial drug manufacturer (i.e., in addition to the pharmaceutical company 
sponsoring the trial, the PI reported an additional FCOI to the company).   
Because some of these 13 clinical trials had more than one PI, and one individual was a 
PI on multiple trials, there were a total of 41 PIs. Twelve out of the 41 (29%) PIs reported 
research funding from the trial drug manufacturer and 8 (20%) had ties other than grant funding 
to the trial drug manufacturer, including three PIs that reported participating on the speakers 
bureau for the company. (See Table 3 for a summary of the PI FCOI data by trial.) 
Discussion  
In all but one trial, FCOIs were found between DSM-5 panel members and the pharmaceutical 
companies that manufactured the drugs that were being tested for the new DSM disorders. The 
financial associations of panel members included research grants, consultation, honoraria, 
speakers bureau participation, and/or stock. Seven out of the 10 patented drugs included in the 
trials either are currently or have been blockbusters for their manufacturers. (A blockbuster drug 
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is defined as a drug that earns over USD 1 billion in revenue in one year; see e.g., [18]). Our data 
show that there are financial ties between some DSM panel members and pharmaceutical 
companies that have a vested interest in finding a new indication for their drugs. A new 
indication allows the drug manufacturer to obtain an additional three years of exclusivity for that 
drug. Pharmaceutical companies have used “exclusivity” as an informal mechanism to 
effectively extend patent protection for that time period [19]. However, it should be emphasized 
that trials examining off-label indications conducted after a patent has expired are not necessarily 
meant to obtain a secondary indication.  
The fact that in 3 out of 13 (23%) of the trials the PIs were also DSM panel members 
raises questions about the potential of such multi-vested interests for implicit bias when making 
decisions about inclusion of new DSM disorders and their respective treatments. These questions 
are pressing in light of the fact that there are no biological markers for the majority of psychiatric 
disorders; the use of subjective discretion to widen diagnostic boundaries becomes more likely 
when there are no biological tests to ground clinical decision-making.  
For example, Binge Eating Disorder may be diagnosed in individuals who do not have 
Anorexia or Bulimia Nervosa and who have the following three “symptoms” one time per week 
for 3 months: 1) eating more rapidly than normal, 2) eating until uncomfortably full, 3) and 
eating large amounts of food when not physically hungry [5]. Mild Neurocognitive Disorder may 
be diagnosed based on “concerns of the individual, a knowledgeable informant, or the clinician 
that there has been a modest decline in cognitive function.” These cognitive deficits “did not 
interfere with capacity for independence in everyday activities” and the decline may be based on 
a “clinical evaluation” (i.e., formal testing is suggested but not required for the diagnosis) [5]. 
Certainly some individuals consistently overeat and some individuals struggle with age-related 
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cognitive decline. However, both researchers and clinicians have expressed concerns about 
“diagnostic inflation” [16] when non-specific diagnoses such as Binge Eating Disorder and Mild 
Neurocognitive Disorder are identified as specific mental disorders. In fact, a former president of 
the APA writing about the revisions to DSM-5 noted that:  
The flexible boundaries of many psychiatric diagnostic categories, in the absence of 
definitive diagnostic tests, may encourage expansive definitions of affected populations 
and create opportunities for industry to promote treatments for people who would not 
previously been seen as having a disorder. [20] 
Indeed, our study shows that increased transparency (e.g., registration on 
ClinicalTrials.gov) and mandatory disclosure policies (such as APA’s disclosure policy for 
DSM-5 panel members) may not be robust enough to prevent the appearance, if not the reality, of 
bias in both the DSM revision process as well as clinical decisions about appropriate 
interventions for DSM disorders. In fact, a 2012 comparison between DSM-IV and DSM-5 panel 
members showed that despite increased transparency, commercial ties remained strong. 
Although some work groups had decreased the number of individuals with industry ties, overall, 
69% of the DSM-5 task force members reported financial ties to industry, representing a 21% 
increase in the proportion of DSM-IV task force members with such ties. Also, three-fourths of 
the work groups continued to have a majority of members with ties to drug firms, and it is 
noteworthy that, as with the DSM-IV, the most conflicted panels are those for which 
pharmacological treatment is the first-line intervention [2]. 
In light of the decrease in government funding of clinical trials over the past two decades, 
it is not surprising that 29% of the PIs of trials in this study reported research funding from a  
trial drug manufacturer. However, 20% of all of the PIs in our sample had financial ties other 
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than research funding with the trial drug manufacturer, and three were on speakers bureaus for 
the manufacturers of the drugs they are investigating. Many policy makers, medical journal 
editors, and bioethicists have raised concerns that the line between marketing and research has 
become blurred [21,22] when researchers have ongoing, close, and lucrative ties with industry 
such as speakers bureau participation.   
Our findings suggest that there may be a risk of industry influence on the DSM revision 
process. Additionally, our findings of FCOI of PIs running the clinical trials suggest that there 
also may be a risk of industry influence on the clinical decision-making process for identifying 
interventions to treat these new “disorders.” Of particular note is the fact that in three of the 
clinical trials, PIs reported that they participated on company speakers bureaus. Such 
participation may have a biasing effect.  Transparency of FCOI and of clinical trial data are 
important first steps in strengthening public and professional trust in evidence-based medicine. 
However, the improvements facilitated by transparency are insufficient. Disclosure alone is not a 
satisfactory response to prevent bias in the revision process for psychiatric diagnostic guidelines 
or for maintaining integrity of psychotropic drug research.  
The present study has several limitations. Our study did not include all of the revised or 
new DSM-5 diagnoses and thus our findings for the six new or modified disorders should not be 
overgeneralized. The sample size is small and caution should be exercised when interpreting the 
data. Also, our metric for assessing independence in clinical decision-making (DSM panel 
members’ and PIs’ financial associations with industry) is an indirect measure and thus no 
conclusion can be drawn about actual bias in decision-making. Moreover, the complexity of the 
debate over FCOI and the potential for bias is compounded by the fact that trials that are 
commercially funded often report negative findings. For example, researchers found that half of 
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the studies on the efficacy of antidepressants failed to show an advantage over placebo (and over 
older tricyclic antidepressants) even though many of these were industry funded studies [23]. 
Despite these limitations, our examination of financial ties among DSM panel members, PIs of 
drug trials, and trial drug manufacturers suggest that the public, clinicians, and policy makers 
should be concerned about the way in which new diagnoses in the DSM-5 may provide an 
opportunity for pharmaceutical companies to effectively extend their patents on blockbuster 
drugs. For example, Eli Lilly is listed on ClinicalTrials.gov as a collaborator for a clinical trial to 
test the efficacy of one of Lilly’s antidepressants (Cymbalta) for “bereavement-related 
depression,” and Eli Lilly is listed as a sponsor for a clinical trial testing Cymbalta for “Binge 
Eating Disorder.” The patent for Cymbalta expires in December 2013. Five of the 12 members of 
the Mood Disorders Work Group and three of the 12 members of the Binge Eating Disorder 
Work Group have ties to Eli Lilly. If the FDA approves Cymbalta for these new indications, 
Lilly will benefit by obtaining another three years of market exclusivity for this drug. It has been 
one of Lilly’s recent blockbuster drugs: In just the fourth quarter of 2012, Lilly reported revenue 
of $1.42 billion from Cymbalta alone (24% of total revenue for that quarter) [24].  
There are also three clinical trials for “Binge Eating Disorder,” testing an antidepressant, 
a “mood stabilizer,” and a psychostimulant as potential treatments for this new condition. (The 
three trial drugs, Cymbalta, Lamictal, and Nuvigil, made US$5 billion, US$937 million, and 
US$347 million in revenue in 2012, respectively.) The FDA requires at least two trials to obtain 
authorization to market a drug for a new indication. Although more trials are needed before the 
FDA would grant authorization, it is important to note that the pharmaceutical companies that 




A call for drug trials that are not sponsored by for-profit entities.  Our FCOI findings show 
the tripartite inter-relationship among DSM panel members, PIs of clinical trials for new DSM-5 
diagnoses, and drug companies. These findings suggest that FCOI may function subtly, but 
powerfully, to shift the direction of the research, focusing on interventions that are the most 
commercially attractive but that do not necessarily represent the best science. Indeed, as was 
recently noted, when NIH decreased funding of clinical trials for new drugs, “turning new drug 
development over to industry, many clinically important clinical trials… were simply not done” 
[25; see also 26]. Hence, there must be systemic valuing and support of disinterested experts and 
their scientific contributions [27], and there is a clear need for drug trials that are not sponsored 
by and managed by industry. In our opinion, PIs should be prohibited from participating on a 
speakers bureau for a company whose drug they are testing. Speakers bureau participation is 
usually prohibited elsewhere (e.g., for faculty in medical schools), as it is widely recognized to 
constitute a significant FCOI [2]. Pharmaceutical companies refer to individuals who serve on 
speakers bureaus as ‘‘key opinion leaders’’ (KOLs) because they are seen as essential to the 
marketing of drugs.  
Finally, as a policy objective, it is critical that the APA recognize that transparency alone 
is an insufficient response for mitigating implicit bias in diagnostic and treatment decision-
making. Specifically, and in keeping with IOM's most recent standards, we recommend that 
DSM panel members be free of FCOI. In the future, DSM panel members should also be 
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Figure 1. Results from searching ClinicalTrials.gov.
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Table 1. Summary of included trial drugs, patent expiration dates, and 2012 revenue. 














Eli Lilly Eli Lilly December, 
2013 
$4,990 
   Jefferson Clinic, P.C.    
2 Complicated grief citalopram hydrobromide 
(Celexa) 





   National Institute of Mental Health    
3 Binge Eating Disorder armodafinil (Nuvigil) Cephalon Cephalon June, 2024 $347 
   Lindner Center for HOPE    
   University of Cincinnati    




Eli Lilly December, 
2013 
$4,990 
   University of Cincinnati    
5 Binge Eating Disorder lamotrigine (Lamictal) GlaxoSmithKline Glaxo-
SmithKline 
Expired $937 
   Lindner Center for HOPE    
   University of Cincinnati    
6 Binge Eating Disorder lisdexamfetamine 
dimesylate (Vyvanse) 
Shire Shire June, 2023 $1,030 
7 Autism Spectrum 
Disorder 
arbaclofen (STX209) Seaside Seaside Unpatented N/A 













Shire Shire June, 2023 $1,030 
   University of California Los 
Angeles 
   
   National Institute of Mental Health    
10 Severe mood 
dysregulation 
risperidone (Risperdal) Federal University of Rio Grande 
do Sul 
Janssen Expired $1,425 















North China Pharmaceutical Group 
Corporation 
Eisai Expired $1,480 








 Revenue for individual drug not found. US$3,694 million reflects total revenue for all Forest Pharmaceuticals central nervous system 
drugs. 
‡
 Revenue for individual drug not found. US$71 million reflects 2009 revenue data from Shire Pharmaceuticals, which held licensing 
rights until between 2003 August, 2010. Total 2012 sales of all products for Noven Pharmaceutical’s parent company, Hisamitsu 
Pharmaceutical Co., were US$1,707 million. 
§
 Revenue for individual drug not found. US$2,874 million reflects total revenue for all Johnson & Johnson neuroscience drugs except 
for Concerta, Invega, and Invega Sustena. 
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Table 2. Summary of FCOI among the included DSM panel members by trial. 
Trial New DSM-5 Diagnosis Trial Drug 
Manufactur
er 
Work Group Work Group 












FCOI to Trial 
Drug 
Manufacturer 
1 Major Depressive Episode, 
bereavement exclusion 
eliminated 
Eli Lilly Mood Disorders 8/12 5/12 20/31 15/31 
2 Major Depressive Episode, 
bereavement exclusion 
eliminated 
Forest Mood Disorders 8/12 1/12 20/31 5/31 
3 Binge Eating Disorder Cephalon Eating Disorders 6/12 0/12 20/31 2/31 
4 Binge Eating Disorder Eli Lilly Eating Disorders 6/12 3/12 20/31 15/31 
5 Binge Eating Disorder Glaxo-
SmithKline 
Eating Disorders 6/12 3/12 20/31 5/31 
6 Binge Eating Disorder Shire Eating Disorders 6/12 1/12 20/31 1/31 
7 Autism Spectrum Disorder Seaside Neuro-
developmental 
Disorders 
5/13 2/13 20/31 1/31 
8 Autism Spectrum Disorder Noven Neuro-
developmental 
Disorders 
5/13 0/13 20/31 0/31 
9 Disruptive Mood 
Dysregulation Disorder 
Shire Child and 
Adolescent 
Disorders 
0/10 0/10 20/31 1/31 
10 Disruptive Mood 
Dysregulation Disorder 
Janssen Child and 
Adolescent 
Disorders 
0/10 0/10 20/31 5/31 




Mood Disorders 8/12 2/12 20/31 5/31 
12 Mild Neurocognitive Disorder Eisai Neurocognitive 
Disorders 
7/8 2/8 20/31 1/31 
13 Mild neurocognitive Disorder Janssen Neurocognitive 
Disorders 
7/8 3/8 20/31 5/31 
Table 3. Summary of FCOI data among trial PIs by trial. 
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Trial New DSM-5 Diagnosis Trial Drug 
Manufacturer 




Funding to Trial 
Drug 
Manufacturer 
PI All Other FCOI 
to Trial Drug 
Manufacturer 
1 Major Depressive Episode, bereavement 
exclusion eliminated  
Eli Lilly 0/1 0/1 0/1 
2 Major Depressive Episode, bereavement 
exclusion eliminated  
Forest 5/5 3/5 2/5 
3 Binge Eating Disorder Cephalon 1/2 0/2 0/2 
4 Binge Eating Disorder Eli Lilly 1/1 1/1 0/1 
5 Binge Eating Disorder GlaxoSmithKline 1/1 0/1 0/1 
6 Binge Eating Disorder Shire 17/21 4/21 3/21 
7 Autism Spectrum Disorder Seaside 5/8 3/8 1/8 
8 Autism Spectrum Disorder Noven 0/1 0/1 0/1 
9 Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder Shire 1/1 1/1 1/1 
10 Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder Janssen 1/1 0/1 1/1 
11 Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder GlaxoSmithKline 0/0 0/0 0/0 
12 Mild Neurocognitive Disorder Eisai 0/1 0/1 0/1 
13 Mild Neurocognitive Disorder Janssen 0/0 0/0 0/0 
 
 
 
